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ABSTRACT
The Institutional Grammar Tool (IGT) is an important and relatively
recent innovation in policy theory and analysis. It is conceptual-
ized to empirically operationalize the insights of the Institutional
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. In the last decade,
political scientists have offered a number of applications of the
IGT, mainly focused on disclosing and scrutinizing in-depth the
textual configurations of policy documents. These efforts, involv-
ing micro-level analyses of syntax as well as more general classifi-
cations of institutional statements according to rule types, have
underpinned empirical projects mainly in the area of environmen-
tal and common-pool resources. Applications of IGT are still in
their infancy, yet the growing momentum is sufficient for us to
review what has been learned so far. We take stock of this recent,
fast-growing literature, analyzing a corpus of 26 empirical articles
employing IGTs published between 2008 and 2017. We examine
them in terms of their empirical domain, hypotheses, and meth-
ods of selection and analysis of institutional statements. We find
that the existing empirical applications do not add much to
explanation, unless they are supported by research questions and
hypotheses grounded in theory. We offer three conclusions. First,
to exploit the IGT researchers need to go beyond the descriptive,
computational approach that has dominated the field until now.
Second, IGT studies grounded in explicit hypotheses have more
explanatory leverage, and therefore, should be encouraged when
adopting the tool outside the Western world. Third, by focusing
on rules, researchers can capture findings that are more explana-
tory and less microscopic.
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1. Introduction
Public policy research in Western scholarship is increasingly dominated by the use of
free-standing analytical frameworks. Most obviously, the field is shaped by the vision
of Paul Sabatier and his colleagues. Their Theories of the Policy Process text (now in its
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fourth edition1) and the US-based Policy Studies Journal have been at the forefront of
this policy theories agenda. Despite individual differences, there is a good deal of vital-
ity around these theories of the policy process, and studies deploying and revising
them abound. This empirical activity has driven questions concerning the reach and
purpose of these approaches.
Thinking about the state of play in policy theory from the perspective of their appli-
cation outside the Western world, two points strike us. First, there is no reason to
silence the debate on a policy theory simply because it does not feature in the main
textbooks or it is ignored by US-based outlets. Paul Sabatier was the first to acknow-
ledge the potential of the French school of referentiel2 in a footnote of the first edi-
tion of Theories (1999: 157n15). Second, regardless of how popular is a theory in the
West, there is the question of how well these theories fare in polities which are not
Western liberal democracies. This second question has stimulated, for example, the
growing literature on applications of the advocacy coalition framework in non-Western
countries (see Han et al., 2014; Henry et al.3).
The readers of this journal interested in the two questions need a map of the cur-
rent theories. Not every theory has the same status, at least in the West. Among these
types, we find what we would call the big explainers (most obviously, Advocacy
Coalition Framework [ACF] and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory [PET]—see Jenkins-
Smith et al.,4 and Baumgartner et al.,5 respectively). These are the main contenders for
the status of dominant theory of the policy process. Then we have the rising stars like
the Narrative Policy Framework ([NPF]—see Shanahan et al.,6). Next are the theories
that are knocking at the door claiming status as part of the conceptual canon such as
policy learning (see Dunlop and Radaelli, 20187). And then, there is yet another cat-
egory we could add—that of sleeping giants. Arguably, this category best describes
the subject of this contribution—the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework.8 Despite being a rare instance of a governance framework that led its cre-
ator to a Nobel prize in economics (in 2009), the IAD’s complexity may have made it
too daunting for widespread world-wide use.
Yet, things are changing fast. In 2011, Policy Studies Journal published the first dedi-
cated special issue to IAD9 and since then, in the policy and environmental sciences
literature, there are signs that the IAD giant may be awakening. This is likely to be
due to scholars’ enduring ambition to conquer fresh analytical ground but it may also
reflect the thorny questions concerning analytical reach of policy theories beyond
Western settings, and their prescriptive potential. In fact, among all the major theories
of the policy process, IAD may make the strongest claims to universality. Its focus on
rules—both as they are written and used—as shaping and being shaped by human
interactions ensures IAD is applicable beyond Western democracies (for an application
to Chinese governance see Zhang).10 A global outlook marks out this research pro-
gram11—notably in the first edition of Theories of the Policy Process12 Ostrom’s IAD
chapter was the only one to report a significant number of applications beyond the
West13 (for this observation see Sabatier14). In this contribution, our aim is simple.
Rather than taking on the totality of the IAD and the many sub-frameworks it has
inspired, we outline and review the empirical applications of one of the most
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adaptable and policy-relevant aspects of IAD inspired work—the Institutional Grammar
Tool (IGT). Before we get started, a few wider words of introduction to the IAD are
in order.
Based on the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom,15 and developed over four deca-
des with their various collaborators, IAD seeks to offer a common language of how
actors’ behavior is framed, guided and constrained by institutions.16 Institutions in the
IAD are rules, or governing arrangements, they form the ‘worlds of action’ (Kiser and
Ostrom, 198217) which are the backdrop for political action. Although the approach
has evolved, the original vision put forward by Ostrom was to contribute to institu-
tional rational choice.18 It was this rational choice orientation that led her to examine
collective action through the analysis of rules.
In ‘action situations’, individuals have roles and take decisions drawing on the infor-
mation available to them. Concerned with collective action dilemmas, zooming-in on
the action situation and its key decision points, IAD focuses on the ways in which
rules—in-form or in-use—shape the alignment of individual and collective interests.
Following the traditional approach to policy sciences marked by Lasswell’s prescriptive
agenda,19 the IAD is motivated by a strong policy design imperative. By understanding
the how and why of institutional design we can make adjustments to improve institu-
tional performance.
To understand why certain governing arrangements have come about, and how
they shape political outcomes, we need tools to examine these action situations. This
is what the so-called IGT was designed for and therefore it is our central focus.
Specifically, we are interested in the conceptualization which breaks down the action
situation into seven rule types—position, boundary, choice, aggregation, information,
payoff and scope (see Figure 1).20 Each rule marks a key moment of actor interaction
and interdependence in a political setting (see Table 6.1).21 These are moments where
authority is prescribed, and used by particular policy participants. The key promise of
Figure 1. IGT rule types. Source: Crawford and Ostrom.64
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such universal rules, which can operate at various levels of abstraction (see Figure 6.3
in Schlager and Cox,22 and empirically Hardy and Kootnz, and Schlager and Heikkila),23
is comparability of cases across space and time. This approach to institutional rules
has connections with Fritz Scharpf’s24 actor-centered institutionalism. But, while
Scharpf was concerned with a limited number of games and ideal-types of interaction
among purposeful actors, the IGT is wider and more forensic. To see this, we turn to
the grammatical component of the IGT.
The grammatical component is known by the acronym ADICO—which stands for
Attributes, Deontic, aims, Conditions and Or else. Originally presented by Crawford
and Ostrom,25 and later developed by Ostrom in her 2005 volume Understanding
Institutional Diversity,26 ADICO is intimately connected to the structure of rules. In this
schema,27 the content of the seven rules types can be identified using the ADICO
grammatical components. Thus, each rule (should) tells us who carries an action (i.e.
the actors involved in an institutional arrangement—A); whether the action is possible,
permitted, mandatory, can or should happen (i.e. the degree of stringency of the
action, typically expressed by the prescriptive operator added to a statement—D); the
action itself available to the actors (I); under which conditions actions take place (i.e.
annually, by date, after a vote, etc.—C); and finally what happens if what is prescribed,
suggested, mandated or incentivized by the rule does not happen (i.e. citizens may go
to court, or there are ways to file a complaint—O). The sentence below exemplifies
how a given institutional statement can be dissected via ADICO:
An example of the application of this syntax is “You must stop your car at a red light or
the police officer will give you a traffic ticket.” Attribute ¼ “you”; deontic ¼ “must”; aim ¼
“stop your car”; condition ¼ “at a red light”; or else ¼ “the police officer will give you a
traffic ticket”.28
Using this IGT—rule types and their grammar—we have both a universal language
and toolkit to analyze the environment people operate in and ultimately get at the
why and how of institutional design. Yet, IGT analysis is not for the faint-hearted. As
the reader will gather, to reap the considerable rewards of comparability, we must be
willing to conduct a forensic examination of the empirics. Proceed only if holding the
hand of an experienced operative is the common refrain in the IAD state of the art
pieces;29 so we must handle with care and all due humility. For it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to resist and increasing efforts are being made to de-mystify the IGT.30
This article is organized as follows. We introduce our research questions, methods
and the corpus of articles selected for the task in Section 2. Section 3 presents the
main findings, before we discuss their implications in Section 4 and provide three con-
clusions in Section 5.
2. Research questions, methods, corpus
The research questions that lead our analysis of the literature are:
1. What are the predominant journals, countries and empirical topics have they been
answered so far?
2. How has the literature evolved over time?
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3. How is the IGT aligned with the research design of the empirical study? IGT can be
used to inform theory, to test rival alternative hypotheses, to measure, to describe,
and so on.
To address these questions with a suitable corpus, we carried out a literature search
for empirical articles using ISI Web of Science.31 Ultimately, we were left with a sample
of 30 articles for our final sift from which a further four were rejected. Crawford and
Ostrom32 is, of course, the main foundation of this literature. It is not empirical and so,
notwithstanding its fundamental role, we do not include it in our corpus. The work by
Smajgl et al.33 is frequently cited but it deals with agent-based simulations rather than
empirical cases. The same holds true for Schulter and Theesfeld.34 We found
McGinnis35 very instructive for definitions and conceptual clarifications—however, it
does not contain empirics. During the preparation of this article, we came across a
very interesting study on the semi-automated extraction of rules by Heikkila and
Weible36—however, this article was not available in early view at the time we carried
out our analysis, hence we did not use it here. In total, we ended up with a corpus of
26 articles (see Appendix 1).
3. Analysis of the literature
3.1. What are the predominant journals, countries and empirical topics have
they been answered so far?
The importance of IGT analysis is shown by the fact that the corpus appears both in
public policy/public administration (PP/PA) journals as well as in journals dedicated to
specific sectors such as environment, urban affairs, water, and health (Table 1). The
PP/PA journals are more frequent in the distribution of the corpus than the journals
dedicated to sectors. Seven authors are the most prolific—Basurto, Carter, Heikkila,
Table 1. IGT outlets and authors.
Outlet Total Author with þ1 IGT article Total
Policy Studies Journal 6 Weible 8
Review of Policy Research 2 Siddiki 6
Ecology and Society 1 Carter 5
Environment and Planning Law Journal 1 Basturo 4
Human Ecology Review 1 Heikkila 3
International Journal of the Commons 1 Watkins 2
International Journal of Public Administration 1 Westphal 2
Journal of American College Health 1
Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 1
Journal of Institutional Economics 1
Journal of Theoretical Politics 1
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 1
Policy & Society 1
Political Research Quarterly 1
Public Administration 1
Regulation & Governance 1
Science of the Total Environment 1
Urban Affairs Review 1
Water International 1
Water Policy 1
Total 26
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Siddiki, Watkins, Weible and Westphal. They account for exactly half the papers in our
corpus (13 articles). Notably, Policy Studies Journal, one of the top-ranked journals in
the ISI’s Public Administration and Political Sciences rankings (10th out of 47 and 18th
out of 169 respectively in the 2017 ISI [JRC, 2018]), stands out as the central outlet for
this type of research (6 articles). The main research questions concern governance and
more precisely common-pool-resource (CPR)-related puzzles. Consequently, the empir-
ical topics in the domain of environmental policy, urban policy problems, and human
geography dominate (Table 2). Despite the portability of the approach beyond
Western contexts, USA-focused cases still dominate comprising 18 of the 26 articles
(with Weible’s location of Colorado the top state by far—5 studies). Yet, the presence
of Mexico, Nicaragua, Nepal and Pakistan may be indicative of more global impact to
come and reassures that IAD is suitable for ontological realities of non-
Western systems.
3.2. How has the literature evolved over time?
The literature is obviously recent (recall our search runs from 2008 to 2017) yet the
corpus may show the beginnings of some patterns. Crawford and Ostrom’s37 original
propositions are clear in their conceptual depth, yet they provide limited operational
guidance on the transition between rule grammars in the abstract and empirical appli-
cations. Part of the increase in IGT research is rooted in attempts to meet this chal-
lenge. Siddiki et al.,38 examining the aquaculture sector in Colorado, is one of the first
manifestations of this transition. This example aims to be completely faithful to the
theoretical claims put forward by Crawford and Ostrom.39 In fact, Siddiki et al.40 apply
ADICO in a surgical way. For them, each statement—drawn from policy documents
(N¼ 346 statements) and legislation (N¼ 35 statements)—is a data point. Hence, the
operational guidance is to count the number of institutional statements that are pre-
sent in a given rule or law. Then, each of these statements is dissected according to
ADICO. The end result of this exercise is twofold: on the one hand, a frequency count
and on the other hand a configurational analysis (2011: 92–93, 95–98). Though Siddiki
et al.41 provide perhaps the most faithful operationalization of IGT, this first application
has given way to a variety of approaches: from this disciplined computational
approach to more eclectic strategies. This is a sure sign that the field is opening up,
though one may argue that the most recent literature is missing the whole point of a
disciplined, forensic approach to institutional statements.
Table 2. IGT countries and sectors.
Place Total Sector Total
USA 18 Environment 9
Australia 2 Water / Irrigation / Flood 5
Canada 1 Tobacco 3
Mexico 1 Forests / Pastures / Commons 3
Nepal 1 Organic Food 2
Nicaragua 1 Other 4
Pakistan 1
Switzerland 1
Total 26 26
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In fact, the story of empirical IGT articles suggests that the most recent contribu-
tions (those published since the 2011 Policy Studies Journal special issue) have moved
towards increasingly complex reconstructions of the action situation via the extraction
of rules and their categorization according to rule types. Thus, we see more open
approaches to IGT, and also a move away from examining ADICO as set of institutional
statements to the meso-category of the action situation based on the categories of
rules identified by Crawford and Ostrom.42
The early enthusiasm for the IGT was channeled via its core computational tools,
ADICO. Arguably, this happened because it is conceptually easy to grasp ADICO and
follow its instructions. But the IGT is wider—actually in our presentation above we
started from rules and then we zoomed on ADICO, the opposite of what Ostrom did.
For instance, the institutional edifice of the IGT contains also the distinction between
norms, rules, and strategies. Yet, before the PSJ special issue (see, for instance, Basurto
et al.43) and also in the context of the SI, ADICO is practically the only tool (in our cor-
pus at least) deployed by the researchers and mainly computationally. Then, after the
relative uptake of the methodology, the same authors that popularised IGT started
enlarging their scope by complementing and enriching ADICO with rule types categor-
ization, that in our view strengthens the explanatory potential of the analysis
(Espinosa44 is a good example of the turn from ADICO as the only concern of empir-
ical analysis to the analysis of rules via ADICO). In other words, the literature seems to
have overcome its preoccupation with getting the instructions given by Ostrom and
Crawford ‘right’ and applying ADICO in the ‘correct way’.
This evolution also shows up in the data types and methods being used by social
scientists. In terms of data, what is important in the context of IGT is the mix between
those articles analysing only rules-in-form—i.e. those codified words found in the for-
mal policy documents—and those including rules-in-use—i.e. as norms that are per-
ceived or understood by policy actors in practice (this, of course, echoes March and
Olsen’s, ground-breaking distinction between old and new institutions [1984]). In our
corpus we find a healthy mix—15 articles go for the rules-in-form, and the remaining
11 focus on those in-use either alone or in combination with those in-form (see Table
3). On the methods front, we see the usual suspects of public policy research. Yet,
what is missing is perhaps more interesting: IGT’s promise is to focus on multi-actor,
multi-rule environments where the logic of action is contextual and configurational
(i.e. the result of the rule mix in a particular place and time). And yet, so far, we
Table 3. Data and method mixes.
Data and method combination Total
IGT / ADICO content analysis of formal policy documents, charters, Acts, legislation, bills, guidance
or legal cases
15
IGT / ADICO content analysis of formal policy documents, charters, Acts, legislation, bills, guidance
or legal cases; and semi-structured interviews with policy actors
3
Semi-structured interviews with policy actors; and context analysis 3
Participant observation; and semi-structured interviews with policy actors 2
Semi-structured interviews with policy actors; and opinion surveys 1
IGT / ADICO content analysis of formal policy documents, charters, Acts, legislation, bills, guidance
or legal cases; semi-structured interviews with policy actors; and, Q-sort interviews
1
Participant observation; semi-structured interviews with policy actors; and opinion surveys 1
Total 26
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observe only one use of configurational analyses.45 The configurational analysis draws
on Boolean algebra. It identifies the combinations of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions that are related to the outcome of interest, effectively drawing on the logic of
case-oriented research.
3.3. How is the IGT aligned with the research design of the empirical study?
Theories. IAD is a conceptual vehicle for the operationalization of rule analysis. As
such, it is compatible with many social science theories. The articles in our sample are
a mix of a-theoretical types—aim only to develop a deep empirical understanding of
an issue—and studies with theoretical ambitions. Of this latter category, we might rea-
sonably expect many to reflect Ostrom’s economic approach and IAD’s focus on over-
coming collective action dilemmas—Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA), game theory and
common pool resources are all common theoretical partners.46 However, none of the
articles restrict themselves to the rational model of human choice (beyond perhaps
Novo and Garrido47 who use the Social-Ecological Systems [SES] framework with IGT).
In fact, we observe theoretical pluralism in the literature with more than half (N¼ 14)
of the articles going beyond economic-inspired approaches to more traditional public
policy ideas—notably, theories of implementation and compliance; regulation; policy
design; local autonomy; collaborative governance and conflict resolution.
Empirical/theoretical/normative focus. We can add a follow-up question to the
previous remark—what do they do with these theories? (How) do they use theory to
align IGT to the empirical study? When it comes to this question, an important distinc-
tion revolves around the empirical/theoretical divide. Nine of the articles work to spe-
cific hypotheses.48 One is an explicitly normative piece;49 this is a little surprising
given the strong prescriptive vision of Ostrom. We might expect more to come with
work evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability dimensions of institu-
tional arrangements. The rest of our corpus (N¼ 16) are what we term exploratory or
descriptive accounts that forensically examine institutional design (usually comparative
in a case study). Given the descriptive nature of the ADICO framework, especially if
used in computational mode, the absence of hypotheses seems to mute the explana-
tory leverage of the empirical analysis.
That said, we should not assume that those contributions that fall into this second
category are unsophisticated. An example is Basurto et al.,50 whose empirical analysis
illustrates the concept of holons, that is, statements that work both as an entire sys-
tem on their own and as part of a larger system. The two legislative policies studied
in that article are not compared but used as parallel examples in the deployment of
the claims and arguments. This article also aligns the IGT with the research design of
nested analysis. The latter is explained as follows:
Given that the grammar of the policy partly determines the number of units coded, the
next challenge is how to aggregate and analyze nested units in a way that conveys
meaning and removes the artificiality from the coding scheme. The method of nesting
might reflect a number of priorities, such as the research question(s) or the scale at which
the researchers wish to draw conclusions. Once the institutional statements are nested
and combined into a collection of institutional statements, those configurations are then
analyzed and become the new units for analysis.51
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The notion of nested analysis is promising for research design but only if there are
explicit hypotheses about the nested structure—unfortunately, the article in question
is not hypotheses-driven and does not provide suggestions.
Hypotheses. Espinosa52 captures an important point when he observes that the
aim of IGT analysis should be to test ‘solid hypotheses about the connection between
the syntax of a regulatory design and the response of the subjects that the regulation
is targeting’.53 Arnold and Fleischman54 test the conventional hypothesis that an
ambiguous mandate causes fragmented, fractured implementation—interestingly, the
empirical analysis does not corroborate this proposition. Looking at irrigation systems
in Nepal, Bastakoti and Shivatoki55 align their IGT analysis with three research ques-
tions that are characteristics of Ostrom’s approach to Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD). These questions are partly descriptive (question a) and partly
explanatory—(a) how does rule formation vary across irrigation systems (b) is rule for-
mation influenced by diversity in biophysical characteristics of the irrigation system
and community attributes (c) how do rule enforcement mechanisms affect perform-
ance and collection action? Hardy and Koontz56 have a similar range of classic
IAD hypotheses.
Setting of the studies. Another important distinction is that most of the empirical
analyses are carried out in a given, often micro-setting, such as aquaculture in
Colorado, certain features of tobacco legislation in Mexico, or irrigation systems in
Nepal (see Table 2). Within a carefully controlled context, IGT and ADICO, in particular,
seem to perform well. The challenge is to scale up to comparative analysis. Possibly,
one efficient option is to draw on explicit hypotheses and move from the micro-
descriptive approach to ADICO to the meso-level of rules and action situations. This is
a bold proposition and admittedly little more than a conjecture.
Findings. One final word on the ‘final product’ of these empirical analyses. What
do the readers really get in terms of hard findings? In some cases, there is little more
than frequencies, word-counts, and flowcharts to explain how the institutional gram-
mar operates. To put it differently, the final product is an illustration of the design of
a policy or a regulation. With a hint of skepticism, one could observe that any lawyer
or practitioner active in the policy field has probably the same kind of flowchart-map-
ping in their mind, and does not need to count the frequency of, for example,
deontics to draw conclusions about how an institutional arrangement fares in terms of
stringency and obligations. In other more mature articles, the reader is offered design
based on theories and findings that speak to a range of hypotheses, corroborating or
rejecting them (see, crucially, Espinosa57). These are of course the more valuable find-
ings that shed light on different explananda such as governance arrangements, regula-
tory compliance and implementation patterns.
4. Drawing lessons
As mentioned, the IGT literature is quite recent and, as far as we know, this is the first
attempt to take stock and look at the empirical articles together. We have already
mentioned that the articles with empirical content often adopt ADICO as the main
analytical device, however, this drive towards ADICO and its variations is problematic.
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On the one hand, the most robust theoretical justification for the adoption of ADICO
leads to the classification of all institutional statements contained in a document, rule
or law. This, however, leads researchers to slice up the relevant text in the ADICO
form, without having a sense of how the slices work together. The high number of
statements analyzed this way directs scholars toward a computational or arithmetic
approach to ADICO, where mere counting limits a deeper understanding of the gram-
mar of institutional action. Even in the extremely limited case of different regulations/
guidelines that govern the aquaculture sector in Colorado, the authors explicitly
acknowledge that ‘[c]onditions were not included within this [frequency] analysis
because this field contained a lot of information that varied significantly between
statements’ and ‘[a] frequency count of aims was conducted, but due to the high
amount of variability between statements, the results are not presented here’.58
Imagine trying to scale up to a comparative project. Here, the problem is not compu-
tational, rather it is interpretative: how to make sense of a very high number of ADICO
statements beyond frequency distributions and descriptive analysis.
On the other hand, if we choose to follow ADICO as rationale and approach, and
we select some key provisions in a text (imagine a law for example), we risk selection
bias. We will have a more parsimonious number of data, but with the risk of censoring
statements that may tell us something important. One possible way out of the para-
dox was already offered by Elinor Ostrom:59 it is the move from ADICO towards the
extraction of rules. Rules are themselves empirically contained in institutional state-
ments. Thus, for example, if we take a Freedom of Information Act, we need a limited
number of articles and clauses to identify position, boundary, choice, aggregation,
information, payoff and scope rules. If researchers are not simply interested in captur-
ing the frequency of actors, aims, conditions and so on, the identification of rules is a
relatively parsimonious way to articulate the action situation. And rules can then be
decomposed in ADICO terms—recall that rules contain all the ADICO elements, in con-
trast to norms (ADIC) and shared strategies (AIC).
What lessons can we draw from the remark made above? Going back to the point
about the evolution of the literature since the PSJ special issue, IGT-informed empirical
research has moved toward the integration of the institutional grammar with the cat-
egorization of the seven rule types. This is because the analysis of rules captures the
essence of the action-situation. Of course, rules are just special types of institutional
statements—indeed if researchers extract rules they are extracting all the five ele-
ments of ADICO.60
5. Discussion and conclusions
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues have provided a formidable actor-centered institu-
tional approach, the IAD. It has an obvious appeal to researchers, like us, who are
interested in regulation and governance, especially if we consider the empirical appli-
cations of the IGT. However, the literature on the empirical applications of the IGT is
still in a nascent phase. Ours is an early attempt to take stock of what has been done
in these empirical applications. Considering the audience of this journal, what are the
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main points to bear in mind in our discussion of how to use the IGT and what are the
lessons learned from the literature?
We would not encourage an exclusive focus on ADICO. Our first conclusion of the
literature review is that the corpus of empirical articles we have examined contains a
good number of detailed, meticulous applications of the IGT informed by ADICO. The
computational approach to ADICO fares well in terms of coherence with the aims and
rigor of the IAD. However, it runs the risk of being rather low on explanatory leverage.
This is possibly one reason why the empirical studies of the most recent years have
scaled up on ambition, for example, looking at rules and rule typologies instead of
simply computing all instances of attributes, deontics, and the other ADICO elements
of the grammar. It makes sense to start with the grammar but only inasmuch it is
used to capture the whole action situation—thus ADICO is absolutely fine, indeed
necessary, in an empirical study if it supports an analytical framework where rules,
norms and strategies have their place.
What about comparability? ADICO is mostly efficient as tool for in-depth, within-case
investigation, and not for comparative analysis. A number of articles that use ADICO,
whether for descriptive or comparative purposes, narrow down their scope to the D
and O components as, admittedly, the degree of heterogeneity of Attributes, aIms
(actions) and Conditions is too large across policy documents belonging to the same
country and policy area to allow for meaningful comparisons.61 ADICO may be helpful
in comparing legal stringency (D and O components), but only if a computational per-
spective is adopted (i.e. counting the prescriptive operators—see for example, Basurto
et al., 2011).62 Yet, this computational approach applied to deontic operators seems to
be of little relevance if we are dealing with hard laws in different countries. Imagine
that we are comparing the Freedom of Information Act in the UK (a relatively long piece
of legislation) and in Austria (a thin legislative act). What would we make of a long list
of statements drawn by the UK and a short list for Austria? Moreover, deontics can sim-
ply refract different legislative traditions: lawmakers in one country prefer to use ‘shall’
and ‘must’, whilst in other countries, the tradition may well be to use ‘will’ or ‘can’. But,
the meaning of the institutional grammar in practice may be the same.
The notion of applying IGT to administrative procedures is not visible in our corpus.
This paves the way for a new phase of empirical applications of the IGT, given the
important of administrative procedures for policy researchers. The non-Western world
is a fabulous laboratory of administrative systems with different legal origins (some
inspired by European models) and purposes (for example, to support a liberal democ-
racy or other types of political systems). At the moment, however, most of the articles
employing IGT-informed approaches deal with the governance of CPRs (in line with
the research interests of Ostrom and her workshop). As a result, the texts to which
ADICO/IGT is applied do not resemble legal acts (sometimes even informal/uncodified
rules and interview data are dissected with ADICO). Even the application of the tool to
full-blown regulations outside the scope of environmental regulations is rather rare,63
let alone its use for primary legislation (which is documented only once64). In short,
there are a lot of intellectual rewards for policy researchers willing to extend this type
of analysis to administrative procedures and even more widely legislation.
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The second conclusion is that the articles that are more computational and frequen-
cies-oriented do not tell us much beyond the particular, very specific issues posed by a
given policy design in a certain, often micro, context. Without explicit hypotheses, the
IGT tilts towards description. For us, this is a problem, especially if we wish to encourage
the readership of this journal to extend IGT usage beyond the Western world.
There are also problems of interpretation and conceptual relevance of the data. To
follow the ADICO protocol in its computational version means coding hundreds, at
times thousands, of institutional statements. The identification of statements, particu-
larly if we are working with one or more legal acts, does not provide a systematization
and a more in-depth understanding.
Consider again the case of analyzing Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) in a
region like Europe through ADICO. In this case, ADICO generates a sort of ‘explosion’
of the individual legal acts rather than their systematization. In the UK FOIA, for
instance, we have an appendix listing hundreds of attributes (i.e. public bodies subject
to Freedom of Information discipline). Collecting them all into the ‘A’ column of an
ADICO table is not informative, most of all if the purpose of the data collection is
comparative across countries. Instead, it seems more useful to approach the Acts in
terms of position and boundary rules, and then compare these rules structures across
countries. This provides a sharper analytical snapshot, based on the myriad of ADICO
pixels, yet capable of extracting patterns from these pixels.
In fact, to explain FOIAs comparatively, we need to know what public bodies are
exempted from its discipline (boundary rules) rather than looking at a huge list of cov-
ered bodies. And for the sake of obtaining this crucial data on exempt bodies, ADICO
may be silent. In fact, ADICO would lead us to attributes (who carries out the action)
leaving to our imagination to figure out that we need to re-interpret ‘attributes’ as
‘who does not carry out the action’. Boundary rules are more straightforwardly send-
ing us the right direction because they would rightly point us towards bodies
exempted from FOIA. Hence, the problem today is not to compute high volumes of
statements, but to extract meanings, interpretations, or simply patterns that make
sense beyond the computational exercise.
Vis-a-vis this problem, we take comfort in our third conclusion, based on the obser-
vation that after an initial period the IGT studies seem to become more open, and
consider the IGT is different ways. In particular, the move from the disciplined applica-
tion of ADICO to the ‘meso-level’ of rules seems to increase the explanatory lever-
age—again, especially in the context of comparative analysis. One important lesson in
this direction comes from the articles in the corpus that make a strong case for adopt-
ing explicit hypotheses that can be tested by comparing types of rule across different
legal texts. We illustrate this point with one example from our own work in the
Protego project.65 In Protego we have hypotheses about how different combinations
of regulatory procedures trigger accountability towards different stakeholders and
core interests, and the IGT provides a theory-informed way to collect data suitable for
comparison according to a single template (based on rules types) that can travel
across different countries, languages and legal cultures.
Our three conclusions question the utility of designing research based exclusively
on the hard-core computational ADICO methodology, especially if we wish to examine
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constructs such as administrative procedure or legal texts covering a sector (for
example, bans of tobacco smoking, or legislation of shale gas extraction). The IGT is a
formidable approach, but if its purpose is to compare legislation or policies grounded
in legislation across countries, it is inefficient to reduce it to a computational ADICO.
To conclude, the challenge for researchers willing to adopt and extend IGT is to cap-
ture the meso level and to go beyond the description of policy design by formulating
substantive, theory-driven conjectures.
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